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ABSTRACT
REBECCA LO: An Analysis of Networking Between Top Executives of Companies
Suspected of Backdating Stock Options
(Under the direction of Dr. Rick Elam)
"More than 100 companies are under investigation for options backdating... If options
backdating problems are found at more companies, Congress may be driven to act.” Brian Cleaiy (Cleary 2007).
The purpose ofthis thesis is to analyze how the practice of backdating employee
stock options has become so widely used. The first hypothesis for this research is that
networking between executives and board members of corporations has caused the idea
of backdating employee stock options to spread. The second hypothesis is that particular
auditing firms are more likely than others to audit corporations accused of backdating
employee stock options. A sample of sixteen companies suspected of backdating was
used for the testing ofthese hypotheses. For each ofthe companies, the names of their
executives and board members were collected from the companies’ Form 10-Ks covering
the period of the suspected backdating. These names were then scrutinized for any
overlap between different companies.
The results of the analysis exposed two instances where an executive or board
member of a company suspected of backdating employee stock options was also an
executive or board member of another company also suspected of backdating employee
stock options. Steven P. Jobs contemporaneously served as Chief Executive Officer and a
board member of Apple Computer and Pixar. James A. Johnson served as a board
member for both KB Home and UnitedHealth Group. It was also discovered that from
the six audit firms providing assurance services for the companies in the sample.

PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP was the auditor for six ofthe sixteen companies suspected
of backdating employee stock options. KPMG,LLP was the responsible firm for four of
the companies in the sample.
The findings produced by the research do not lead to conclusive evidence that the
pervasive practice of backdating employee stock options is caused by the actions of one
or two executives spreading the idea from company to company. Additionally, the
discovery that PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP was the auditor for more companies
suspected of backdating employee stock options than other audit firms does not prove
that the firm was responsible for carrying the idea for backdating from one client
company to another. From the limited sample of companies tested in this research, it does
not appear that networking between executives and board members is accountable for the
numerous scandals revolving around backdating employee stock options.
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Introduction
“More than 100 companies are under investigationfor options backdating... If
options backdating problems are found at more companies. Congress may be driven to
act. ”

This quote taken from an article by Brian Cleary in the April 2007 The CPA
Journal is an example of the numerous headlines splashed across newspapers warning the
public about the widespread practice of backdating stock options. The questionable
treatment of stock options by executives at companies such as Apple Computer, Inc. and
Monster Worldwide suggests top management greed at the expense of stockholders. In an
effort to relieve the economy from such illicit activities, the Securities and Exchange
Commission is performing extensive investigations into the treatment of stock options as
a form of compensation to key employees.
The use of employee stock options was originally hailed as an ingenious method
of boosting employee productivity and company loyalty with no immediate impact on the
companies’ cash flow. By giving employees the right to buy a specified number of
shares in the company at a fixed price for a defined period oftime, the company expects
that employees will be more interested in the profitability ofthe company. If the
company's stock rises, holders of options experience a direct financial benefit(Ruud 3-4).
The goals of the employees would therefore be better aligned with the goals of the
company.
The amount of executive compensation can be a material amount on a company’s
financial statements. The discovery ofinappropriate backdating of executive stock
options can cause the need for restatement of companies’ financial statements. Since
1

much of the world economy depends on the transparency ofa company’s financial
statements, the revaluation of stock options could make equity markets much more
volatile.
This research asks the two questions, is there possible networking among the
executives and board members tfom companies under investigation for possible
backdating by the Securities and Exchange Commission, and are the backdated options
being overlooked and/or suggested by one particular audit firm?
General Description of Stock Options
Stock options are a widely popular form of compensation for key employees.
Stock options awarded by the company gives the employee the right to buy a specific
number ofshares of the company’s stock during a time period and at a purchase pnce set
by the employer. The value ofthe stock options relies directly on the value ofthe
underlying security. If the company’s performance has increased the stock price above
the purchase price specified by the company, the employee receives extra compensation
when he or she buys the stock at the lower price and sells it at the higher price.
The theory behind issuing employee stock options instead of cash compensation
is to align company employees’ interests with those of shareholders by turning paid
managers into part-owners(Rudd 3-4). “An influential article in the Harvard Business
Review in 1990 argued that, if top executives were rewarded like bureaucrats, they would
behave like them,too”(“Executive Remuneration” 13).
The earliest known use ofoptions trading dates from 7**^ century BCE in Greece.
When Thales of Miletus suspected that the olive harvest would be extremely bountiful for
the year, he put a deposit on every olive press in his region. Since the olive harvest later
2

proved to be huge, the demand for olive presses quickly escalated. Thales then sold his
rights, or options, to the olive presses and received a considerable profit(“The Evolution
of Modem Options Trading”).
Employee stock options should not be confused with stock options that can be
bought and sold on the Chicago Board Options Exchange. Modem stock option trading
began with the formation of the Chicago Board Options Exchange(CBOE)on Apnl 26,
1973. At that date, the CBOE traded sixteen standardized, exchange-listed equity options.
Within the first year of establishment, the CBOE traded over one million option
contracts. The Options Clearing Corporation(OCC)was also formed m 1973 in order to
help insure the stability and integrity of the options market. As options became more
popular over the next few years, other securities exchanges entered the business(“CBOE
History”). Though widely traded, this particular form of stock options is not the focus of
this paper.
The next section ofthis thesis presents an overview of the backdating issue and
describes the research question and hypotheses followed by a description of data and
methods of research.
The Backdating Issue
Employee stock options offer a way to effectively reward key performers while
preserving cash needed for corporate operations. For this reason, the use of stock options
has become one ofthe most widely used forms of executive compensation, replacing
more costly methods such as large cash bonuses, permanent salary increases, or generous
retirement plans(Ruud 3-4).

3

Stock options are a major focus in the business world, but the practice is no longer
receiving the praise it once did. With new stock option scandals being uncovered each
day, it is easy to believe that the great wealth that can come from stock option ownership
has enticed some executives and their companies into using stock options in unethical
and possibly illegal ways.
Backdating ofstock options refers to “options that are issued retroactively to
coincide with low points in a company’s share price to increase the recipient’s potential
windfall” ( ●Chummy CEOs Part of Backdating Club”). By setting the grant date of the
option to a day when the price of the stock is low, the holder will often receive a much
higher reward when the options are exercised. Erik Lie studied the behavior ot stock
prices before and after stock option grants were made and concluded that the backdating
was purposely performed. “[Lie] discovered that unless executives possessed truly
extraordinary abilities to forecast precise overall market movements, they had to be
backdating the grants” (Colvin). This discovery led to an increased pressure for the
Financial Accounting Standards Board and the Securities and Exchange Commission to
regulate the rewarding of stock options to top executives and to ensure financial
statement transparency. Though backdating seems like it should be illegal, the practice is
acceptable as long as it has been properly approved, documented in the minutes of the
board of directors, and accounted for in the company’s financial statements. Company
executives are responsible for clearly communicating to their shareholders which options
have been backdated since the shareholders are the people who must pay the inflated
compensation that usually results (Lie).
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The problem is that many companies have attempted to cover up these events
from stockholders and creditor. The Securities and Exchange Commission is currently
investigating backdating practices of numerous publicly traded corporations.
Research by Eric Lie and Randall Heron found that 29.2% of companies issuing
options to executives and/or directors between 1996 and 2002 have grant date patterns
that suggest backdating or other manipulative practices, and 23% of options issued to
executives appear to have been backdated or spring-loaded (Rosen).
Spring-loading is another type ofoption-granting practice that is closely related to
backdating. However, instead of retroactively altering the date of the options to a date
with a lower stock price, spring-loading anticipates an increase in stock price. Spring
loading a stock option refers to a practice where the stock option is “granted at a time that
precedes a positive news event”(Lie, Rosen). With the release ofthe positive news
following the grant ofstock options, the value ofthe underlying stock usually tends to
skyrocket and allows the option-holder to receive an almost instantaneous profit(Lie,
Rosen).
A question related to the stock option backdating is how the practice became so
widespread in such a short period of time. Could the practice have been suggested
through a network of executives and corporate board members? Could one CPA firm
have carried the idea to clients? Networking allows businesspeople to share their
information and thoughts on subjects. Networking is beneficial in creating a business
environment of constant innovation. Unfortunately, people may use networking to
spread unethical ideas for their own benefit.

5

“It wouldn’t be a surprise if knowledge like this got passed along among
executives and had a cascading effect through the community,” said James Post, a
Boston University professor specializing in corporate governance and business
ethics. “Just as networks pass along good ideas, they can play a critical role in
passing along bad ideas too.”(“Chummy CEOS Part of Backdating Club )
Accounting for Stock Options
Stock options as a form of compensation, especially for executives, have always
been a focal point in the business press. However, recent articles are no longer
exclaiming the virtues of this so-called “win-win” approach to compensating key
employees. With scandals being discovered and reported, much ofthe financial
population are demanding that action be taken to bring accurate financial statement
transparency to the world. Before one gets caught in the heated debates over backdating,
it is important to gain an understanding about the basic accounting treatment of stock
option compensation.
In an effort to assure uniformity among companies’ financial statements, the
Financial Accounting Standards Board(FASB)was established in 1973. FASB was
charged with forming a framework of guidelines for financial accounting. This
framework,known as generally accepted accounting principles(GAAP),is a set of
accounting principles, standards, and procedures that outline the way

accountants should

record transactions and prepare and present financial statements. By requiring that
companies follow GAAP,users are guaranteed financial statements have a minimum
level of consistency that aids in the comparison of the companies’ financial positions
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(‘‘Facts about FASB’'). GAAP addresses all areas ofthe financial statement, including the
valuation and accounting for stock option compensation.
Employee stock options are awarded to key employees in order to give them the
right, but not the obligation, to buy a certain number of shares in the company at a
predetermined price. This fixed price is called the “grant” price and usually equals the
market price on the date the options are granted. Employees who have been granted
stock options are presumed to have a greater interest in the performance of the company
in hopes that the share price will increase. The employee can then “cash in” by
exercising, or purchasing, the stock at the lower grant price and then reselling their shares
at the higher current market price. The employee only buys the stock ifthe price has
increased. Holders ofemployee stock options face no financial risk ifthe stock prices
decrease. Gains benefit the holder, or employee, while acting as expense to the writer, or
the corporation(Mantzke 24-27).
Before the employee can exercise the options, a required vesting period must
pass. A vesting period is the specified waiting period between the grant date of the stock
option and the date at which the option may be exercised. “Cliff vesting refers to vesting
that occurs at a single point in time. In contrast, graded vesting occurs gradually, with
portions of the options vesting at intervals over a number of years”(Mantzke 27). The
average length of a vesting period ranges from two to four or more years. The options
expire ifthe employee fails to exercise them by a specified deadline date, often ten years
after the vesting date. This built-in expiration date is a mechanism that forces the
eventual exercising of the options. Employee stock options are non-transferable, which is
a stipulation that keeps the options from being sold to an outside party. The only
7

exception to this rule is in the case ofthe employee’s death, in which case the spouse
gains control of the vested options(Mantzke 27).
Accounting and Auditing Issues
The accounting treatment for stock options is one ofthe most controversial in the
accounting profession. This debate stems from the disagreement over the manner in
which stock option compensation should be expensed by the issuing company. The
intrinsic value based method was prescribed by the Accounting Principles Board Opinion
No. 25. Later the fair value based method was recommended and eventually required in
the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s Statement of Financial Accounting Standard
123(R).
Issued in 1972, the APB Opinion No. 25 measured stock options using the
intrinsic value method. Under the intrinsic value method for measuring stock options, the
amount of compensation to be expensed at the time the options are granted was
determined as the excess ofthe market price over the option exercise price(Apostolou
and Crumbley 30-31). For example, ifthe option’s grant price is $10 per share and the
stock is trading at $12 on the grant date, the option has an intrinsic value of$2 per share.
However, because most employee stock options had exercise prices equal to or above
current market prices when granted, there was no compensation expense to be
recognized. The vast majority of corporations found this method of measurement to be
the most beneficial, as there was no expense to subtract from their revenue. Without any
stock option compensation expense to be recognized, the intrinsic value based method
results in a higher reported net income for the company(Apostolou and Crumbley 31).
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In June of 1993, the Financial Accounting Standards Board(FASB)revisited the
issue of stock option accounting in an effort to make financial statements more
transparent to the public. FASB is the private-sector organization that is responsible for
setting standards for financial accounting and reporting in the United States. Their
proposal for companies to begin expensing stock options under the fair value method
sparked a huge political opposition that led FASB to drop their attempt(Mantzke 28-29).
The reason for this strong resistance was due to the fact that under the fair value
method, the value of the stock option is estimated by applying an option pricing model at
the date it is granted to an employee. This estimated fair value is then charged to
compensation expense over the life of the option’s vesting period. Many companies
argued that they would suffer losses from having to report this compensation expense that
would not be recognized under the intrinsic value method. They also feared that the
public’s negative reaction to the company having to restate their financial statements
would greatly impair their stock price, in addition to the great embarrassment it would
cause them in the corporate world (Apostolou and Crumbley 32-33).
In 1995, FASB compromised between its original proposal and the popular
intrinsic value method by issuing the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
(SFAS) No. 123, titled “Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation.” This statement
only recommends, but does not require, that companies expense stock options under the
fair value method. This allowed companies to continue the use of the intrinsic value
method. However, companies were required to disclose in their footnotes to the financial
statements the amount of compensation expense that would have been reported had the
company been using the fair value method.
9

FASB changed its position with the December 2004 release of Statement No.
123(R). Under SFAS 123(R), the opportunity to choose between intrinsic value and fair
value is no longer available. This statement significantly changed the standards for
financial statement reporting of stock options.
Statement No. 123(R), Share-Based Payment, mandated that the use ofthe
intrinsic value method of accounting for stock options would no longer be acceptable.
Generally accepted accounting principles(GAAP)would require the fair value based
method, which would recognize a compensation expense based on the observable market
price of an instrument with similar terms. If a similar option was not available for
comparison, the company should use

an option pricing model to estimate the fair value of

the option. The company should then recognize the compensation cost over the vesting
period of the option or the period in which the employee provides service to receive the
award.
FASB required the new statement be implemented by publicly-traded companies
is

for all reporting periods beginning after June 15,2005. If the public company
considered a small business issuer(with reported revenue less than $25 million) or the
company is not publicly traded, they must implement Statement 123(R)for their first
annual reporting period after December 15,2005(Eaton and Prucyk 65). According to
research by Standard & Poor’s, the implementation ofthis statement would have likely
reduced the reported earnings for 2004 among the S&P 500 by approximately 7.4%
(Kunkel and Lau 28-29).
Though Statement No. 123(R)requires the use of the fair value based method, it
did not specify a particular option pricing model to use to calculate the fair value of the
10

underlying stock when there is not a similar instrument in the market with which to
compare the stock option. Therefore, under the required fair value based method,the
company has the choice of using two basic models, the closed-form or the lattice. The
model the company chooses to use, however, must encompass the following factors: the
exercise price of the option, the expected term ofthe option, the current market pnce of
the underlying shares, the expected volatility of the price of the underlying shares for the
expected term of the option, the expected dividends on the underlying shares, and the
risk-free interest rate(“SPAS No. 123(R)” par. A13-A18).
The following chart illustrates the various methods of measuring the value of
stock options.
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Figure 1: Methods of Valuing Stock Options

Measurement of
Stock Option Value

APB Opinion No.25

SFASNo.123

Intrinsic Value
Based Method

Ability to Choose
(Footnote Disclosure
of Fair Value Method)

SFAS No.l23(R)
Fair Value
Based Method

Closed Form Model

Lattice Model

Black-ScholesMertOn

Binomial Lattice
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The Black-Scholes-Merton model is the most commonly used closed-form model,
which results in a greater comparability to other companies who also use this option
pricing model. This particular model is easily integrated into a spreadsheet and is popular
among companies because it consists of a defined equation (Eaton and Prucyk 66). An
example of the use of this equation is shown below in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Black-Scholes-Merton Option Pricing Model
Black-Scholcs-Menon
a closcd-form model CPAs am use to value optiottt on assets
whose volanliw ts consent over rime ami which
a comwnt aiMdena yield and n<^k-mre
r.ite. It requires these inputs for v.iluati.m:(Example numlwrs pmvrided are for illusrr.moti pur
poses only)
■ C'urTciU sttnk price (S)..is an e-xample $50,
■ E.vercise price (X),for e.xaniple $40.
■ Expcctcvl time ro inatunty FI"), for c.xampk 4 yc.irs,
■ Risk-fn-'c rate (r,>, for example .E.S%.
■ Dividend yield (d.). for c.xampic 1.5%.
^ ^
■ Expected volatility of the stock price (tr), for example 35%.
■ NO the ctimulKw
deiKity function which .t»is<K the ptotobiht>. oft. s'von
muuber falling.« or below .1 given vilue.
■ e is the h.isc of a naniral logarithm liefined as 2.71838IS.
Using this tormula the l$lack-5choles v'alue of a call option can be written as
/ c 'N
and r//=ln .
■S^V -X

+frrd,+|^yr
“7

and 42^

7

(r>T
Substituting the numbers from the example:
In

^$5<A ... fil.tas-0.01 S-fO-dS-") 4
^(>.7831 and d7-=^l>.7831-0..3?,4-^0.0831
0.35 v4

N(.7H3I) =0.78.32, N((>.()831) = 0.5331
c;=S50f

Lli V

■^).7832

u

-

'"■'0.53.M=SiH.34

Thus the optiou in this e.xaniple has a value of $I8..34.

(Eaton and Prucyk 64)
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Example of Accounting for Employee Stock Options
Using the Eaton/Prucyk example in Figure 2, assume that a company grants 1,000
options to employees on January 1, 2007. On the date ofthe grant, the company does not
make a journal entry, but they do use the Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing model to
estimate the amount of compensation expense that will be recorded as an adjusting entry
at the end ofeach year during the vesting period. This amount is then allocated over the
four year vesting period, or period in which the employees perform the service. Each
option allows the employees to purchase one share of$10 par value common stock at a
price of$40. The options are exercisable beginning January 1, 2011. On the grant date,
the company’s stock was trading at $50, and the Black-Scholes-Merton model
determined the total compensation expense to be $18,340($18.34 X 1,000). Below are
the journal entries the company will make at the end ofeach year following the granting
of the options.
1 / 1 /2007

No entry on date of grant

12/31/2007

Compensation Expense
Paid in Capital- Stock Options
($18,340 X 14)

4,585

Compensation Expense
Paid in Capital- Stock Options

4,585

Compensation Expense
Paid in Capital- Stock Options

4,585

Compensation Expense
Paid in Capital- Stock Options

4,585

12/31/2008

12/31/2009

12/31/2010

4,585

4,585

4,585

4,585

The end ofthe year adjusting entries for 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010 all have the
same effect on the balance sheet and the income statement for those periods. The overall
14

stockholders’ equity section on the balance sheet is not affected because recognizing the
Compensation Expense lowers Retained Earnings, but the credit to Paid in Capital- Stock
Options increases the Additional Paid in Capital (part of Contributed Earnings) section of
stockholders’ equity by an equal amount. The recognition of Compensation Expense in
the Operating Expenses section of the income statement works to decrease net income by
$4,585 each year.
Assume that on February 1, 2011, all 1,000 options were exercised when the
market price for the company’s stock was $60 per share. On February 1, 2011, the
employees buy stock at the option contract price of$40 per share by pacing the comp

y

$40,000 in cash. The company makes the following journal entry, and the employees then
sell the shares for $60 each through a stock broker.
2/ 1 /2011

40,000
Cash (1,000 X $40)
18,340
Paid in Capital - Stock Options
($18,340 X 1,000/1,000 = $18,340)
Common Stock (1,000 X $10)
Paid in Capital in excess of par
(Plug Value)

10,000
48,340

The effects on the balance sheet and income statement for the year when options
are exercised are very different from the previous adjusting entries. The company’s asset
section of the balance sheet is increased by receiving cash for the amount of the options’
exercise price. The overall effect ofthe exercise is to increase the stockholders’ equity on
the balance sheet. Though the debit to Paid in Capital- Stock Options decreases this
Additional Paid in Capital account by the compensation expense amount estimated on the
grant date, the credits to Common Stock, at par value, and Paid in Capital in excess of
par, for the remainder, act to increase the Capital Stock and Additional Paid in Capital
15

sections of stockholders’ equity. The accounting entry required when employees exercise
stock option has no effect on the income statement.
Now assume that the options must be exercised by December 31,2013, the
expiration date. Instead of exercising all the options on February 1,2011, the employees
only choose to exercise 800 options and the remaining 200 options were not exercised
and lapsed at the end of 2013. The entries for the exercise and retirement follow.
2/1/2011

12/31/2013

Cash(800XS40)
Paid in Capital - Stock Options
($18,340X800/1,000)
Common Stock(800 X $10)
Paid in Capital in excess of par

32,000
14,672

3,668
Paid in Capital- Stock Options
Paid in Capital - Expired Options
($18,340-$14,672)

8,000
38,672

3,668

The journal entry for February 1,2011 had the same effect on the balance sheet
by increasing the assets and stockholders’ equity. There is still no effect on the income
statement. The entry on December 31,2013 to retire the unexercised options has no
overall effect on the stockholders’ equity section ofthe balance sheet. One Additional
Paid in Capital account is increased while another Additional Paid in Capital account is
decreased by the same amount. This entry also does not have any effect on the income
statement.
Other companies prefer to use a lattice model, such as a binomial one, because
they feel that it provides more accurate estimates of option compensation expense since it
can take more assumptions into account than the Black-Scholes-Merton model. The
binomial lattice model is able to incorporate multiple inputs into its computation, while
the Black-Scholes-Merton model is only able to consider one set of inputs. For these
16

reasons, FASB originally made the recommendation that the binomial lattice model be
the required model. Many companies did not want to use the lattice model because its
computation is so complex. After receiving a great deal ofthe public’s aversion to this
requirement, FASB decided to leave the choice to the companies(Eaton and Prucyk 66).
Though Statement No. 123(R) ended the feud between whether to use the intrinsic
value method or the fair value method, it still leaves many questions unanswered about
share-based compensation. By allowing companies to choose which option pricing model
they would prefer to use, different amounts of compensation expense can be reported by
choosing to use the Black-Scholes-Merton model over the binomial lattice model or viceversa. This lack of comparability among companies may force FASB to require the use of
a particular model in the ftiture. Furthermore, a company can use various estimates based
on their own expectations within the computation ofeach model(Eaton and Prucyk 6768). The FASB needs to find a way to standardize these estimates in order to have
amounts on the financial statements that are transparent and easily comparable to
competing corporations in their industry.
Impact of FASB Statement No. 123(R)on Privately Held Companies
For the first annual reporting period after December 15, 2005, privately held
companies were required to implement FASB Statement No. 123(R)in the valuation of
employee stock options. While a publicly-traded company has stock being traded on an
exchange, privately held companies do not trade stock on an exchange. Similar to
publicly-traded companies. Statement No. 123(R)requires stock options granted by
privately held companies to be expensed based on the fair value at the time ofthe grant.
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However, privately held companies face several issues that are unique to the valuation of
their employee stock options.
Statement No. 123(R) prescribes the use of an option pricing model to value stock
options that do not have an observable market price ofan instrument with similar terms.
A particular option pricing model is not required to be used, but FASB stated that both
the lattice model and closed-form model meet the criteria(“SFAS No. 123(R) p^- A13A14). Most publicly-traded companies use the Black-Scholes-Merton model, but this
pricing model is not easily adapted to fit the needs ofemployee stock options granted by
privately held companies.
When a stock option granted by a publicly-traded company is exercised by an
employee, he or she receives a share ofthe company’s stock that has already been
authorized for sale. As the share was already in existence and available to be bought and
traded, the exercise of the stock option had no effect on the value ofthe underlying
shares. Unlike the exercise of stock options granted by publicly-traded companies, the
exercise of a stock option granted by a privately held company results in the authonzation
and issuance of new shares ofstock. In essence, these stock options are more correctly
identified as stock warrants. The newly issued stock has a dilutive effect on both the
company’s common shares and its employee stock options. For privately held companies,
the impact of the dilutive effect cannot be observed in market prices.
As there are no observable market prices, CPAs rely on appraised values that are
allocated to existing shares and outstanding employee stock options. When valuing
employee stock options, a direct input in the model is the value ofthe underlying stock.
Since the dilutive effect simultaneously impacts the value of existing shares and
18

outstanding employee stock options and most option valuation models require stock
value as an input, option-pricing models should be modified to allow both stock value
and employee stock option value to be determined simultaneously.
For this reason, the Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing model is not suitable for
valuing employee stock options granted by privately held companies as it will lead to
incorrect employee stock option values and incorrect stock values. The Hull-White
approach is more easily adapted to fit the needs for valuing these options. A lattice
model, the Hull-White approach can be altered to incorporate many option features not
adaptable by the closed-form model. The Hull-White approach can be customized to
simultaneously determine stock price and option value, taking the dilutive effect into
consideration. This results in the correct valuation ofexisting stock and employee stock
options.
Another critical difference between the valuations ofemployee stock options
granted by publicly-traded companies and privately held companies concerns volatility.
A significant input into an option valuation model, volatility is difficult to estimate as it is
based on a combination ofempirical data, advanced statistical techniques and the use of
professional judgment”(Sellers, Huang, and King 44-52).
The expected volatility, the amount of volatility estimated for the remainder of the
option’s life, is computed using historical market price data. Privately held companies do
not have this historical data available to them. To estimate the expected volatility of
employee stock options granted by privately held companies, Statement No. 123(R)
provides two alternative sources (Sellers, Huang, and King 54-56).
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1. Identify similar public companies. If a company can identify similar public
companies, it should consider the historical, expected or implied volatility of
those public companies’ shares to help estimate expected volatility.
2. Identify an appropriate index. If no similar public companies can be
identified, one should identify and use the volatility of an appropriate
industry or subindustry index (see example at paragraph A139 of Statement
no. 123(R)).
(Sellers, Huang, and King 56)

For the reasons stated above, Statement No.l23(R) has a very different impact on
the valuation methods for stock options granted by publicly-traded companies and
privately held companies. Though the focus ofthis study is limited to stock options
granted by publicly-traded companies, it is imperative to note that the use of a particular
option-pricing model can yield incorrect values if care is not taken to ensure correct
information is inputted.
Examples of the Impact of Backdating on Financial Statements
The practice of backdating stock options has provided lucrative gains for key
employees from many different companies. As a simple example ofthe impact
backdating can have, assume the CEO for Miracle Tech Company, Mrs. Doe, receives
part of her compensation in stock options. The board of directors for Miracle Tech
Company awarded Mrs. Doe two million stock options with a grant date of August 15,
2007. At this date, the underlying stock was valued at $6 a share which was also the
exercise pnce.
In an effort to receive a maximum benefit from her stock options, Mrs. Doe
studied the behavior ofthe company’s stock prices. She noticed that the stock price from
the month prior was $3 a share and communicated this infonnation to other employees in
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top management positions. Upon receipt ofthis information, top management agreed to
backdate the options granted from the original date of August 15,2007 to July 15,2007
without attempting to gain approval from the board.
In effect, Mrs. Doe was granted two million stock options with a $3.00 per share
grant price on August 15 that was dated July 15. As a result ofthis backdating, the stock
options’ worth surged to a potential gain of$6 million [(2 million options *($6 market
price - S3 exercise price)]. Assuming that the vesting period had passed, Mrs. Doe could
exercise her options by buying the stock for $6 million and selling them at the current
market price of$12 million. Without taxes and other fees taken into considerations, Mrs.
Doe could have netted a profit of$6 million.
The backdating of stock options also affects the company’s financial position.
Without the backdating, the options would have had both a grant price and exercise pnce
equal to $6. Using the Black-Scholes-Merton model, each option would have a fair value
of$1.71. With two million options. Miracle Tech Company would recognize
compensation expense of$3,426,851.05 to reduce reported net income.
However, since the options were backdated, the options have both a grant and
exercise price of$3. Now the options would each have a fair value of only $0.86. Miracle
Tech Company would only have to recognize compensation expense of$1,713,425.52.
By backdating the stock options. Miracle Tech Company would not have to recognize
such a large amount of compensation expense. As a result, the reported net income would
be much larger than without.
The hypothetical example helps to develop an understanding of scandals that

are

actually occurring. Apple Computer, Inc. has faced many allegations from the Securities
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and Exchange Commission concerning their abuse ofbackdating stock options. Fred
Anderson, Steve Jobs, and four unnamed executives have been under intense scrutiny for
options they received.
Fred Anderson - 1997:
Acting as Chief Financial Officer for Apple Computer from 1996 to 2004, Fred
Anderson resigned while under investigation by the SEC for allegedly backdating stock
options. Anderson was granted an option for two million shares of Apple stock that was
dated July of 1997, a date when the market price ofthe underlying stock was unusually
low at $3.00 a share. Though the actual date of original grant is not known,if it was in
the next month the stock price surged to $7.50 per share (“Perfect Payday: Option
Scorecard”). By being able to exercise the options at the backdated amount of$6 million,
Anderson would receive a very large profit by selling his stock for $15 million. Due to
the backdating of Anderson’s stock options by one month, the former CFO raked in a
profit of$9 million.
Apple Computer also benefitted from the backdating of Anderson’s stock option
compensation. Under SFAS 123, Apple could use the intrinsic value method for
recognizing compensation expense and would not report any expense related to their
stock options due to the fact that the grant price equaled the current stock price at the
stated time of grant. As required by SFAS 123, Apple had to disclose the amount of
compensation expense the company would have to recognize using the fair value method
in the footnotes to the financial statements. Using the Black-Scholes-Merton model, the
company would have to disclose expense in the amount of$1.58 per share. This amount
of expense is not recognized, however, and does not affect Apple’s reported net income.
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However, if SFAS 123(R) had been in effect in 1997, the company would
recognize compensation expense based on the options’ fair value. At July of 1997 Apple
would have to recognize compensation expense in the amount of$1.58 per share, or
$3,164,488.06 for all two million shares. Recognizing this expense would have a direct
impact on Apple’s reported profitability and increased Apple’s reported net loss from
$1,045,000,000 to $1,048,000,000.
This amount of expense is greatly reduced by the effect of backdating the options.
Using the Black-Scholes-Merton model, if the options had been valued using the actual
grant and exercise amounts for the next month, the compensation expense to be
recognized would be $3.96 per share. In other words,if the options had been valued at a
grant price that is closer to the average Apple Computer stock price, the total
compensation expense to recognize for Anderson’s two million options at fair value
would total to be $7,911,220.15. This increased compensation expense would further
reduce the company’s net income. The original reported loss of$1,045,000,000 would
increase to a loss of$1,053,000,000 if the effect ofbackdating was removed. Figure 3
shows the impact of changing compensation expense related to employee stock options
on Apple’s income statement.
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Figure 3: Effect of Fred Anderson’s Backdated Stock Options on Apple Computer’s
Income Statement

Apple Computer
Consolidated Statements of Operations for the fiscal year ended September 26,
1997
(Dollars in millions)
Fred Anderson

Net Sales
Costs and expenses:
Cost of sales
Research and development
Selling, general and administrative
Special charges:
In-process research and
development
Restructuring costs
Termination of license agreement
Operating income (loss)
Interest and other income (expense), net
Income (loss) before provision (benefit) for
income taxes
Provision (benefit) for income taxes
Net income (loss)
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Origina

Restated
under
SFAS 123(
R)with
backdatin

$7.081

1
$L081

5,713
485
1,286

5,713
485
1,289

5,713
485
1,294

375
217
75
8.151
(1>070)
25

375
217
75
8.154
(1,073)
25

375
217
75
8.159
(1,078)
25

(1,045)
0
($1.045

(1,048)
0

(1,053)
0

1

($1.048)

($1,053)

Restated
under SFAS
123(R)
without
backdating
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Steve Jobs - 2000:
As part of the executive stock option compensation plan, Steve Jobs, the Chief
Executive Officer of Apple Computer, was awarded forty million options which were
reported as being granted at January of2000. The market price ofthe underlying stock at
that time, and therefore the grant price for the options, was around $20 a share. The
options were suspected of being backdated due to the fact that the grant price in January
was much lower than the months before and after the reported grant date. In fact, in
February of 2000 -the next month - the market price for Apple stock raised to $30 a
share. Though Jobs later cancelled these options in exchange for restricted stock, if he
had exercised these options for $800,000,000 and sold them for $1,200,000,000, he
would have received a profit of$400,000,000(“Perfect Payday: Options Scorecard”). In
fact. Jobs may have exchanged his options for restricted stock in an effort to avoid the
backlash from the SEC for backdating stock options.
If Apple Computer had used the intrinsic value method for recognizing
compensation expense, no expense would be reported since the current market price and
grant price were the same at time of grant. However, using the Black-Scholes-Merton
model to measure the fair value of the stock options as required under SFAS 123(R), the
corporation would have to deduct compensation expense in the amount of$11.18 per
share or $447,054,150.77. This increase in expense would decrease the company’s
reported income from $786,000,000 to $339,000,000.
Though the stated fair value of the stock options would reduce net income by
around $447 million, this amount for compensation expense is greatly undervalued due to
the effect of backdating. For example, if the stock options were valued under the Black25

Scholes-Merton model using the market price and grant price for February, the fair value
of each option would be $16.56. Taking all of Jobs’ forty million options into
consideration, Apple Computer would have to recogmze compensation expense of
$670,581,226.16. The difference in compensation expense resulting from the use of
backdating would be $223,527,075.39, which is also the amount that reported net income
would be overstated due to backdating. By removing the effect of backdating when
recognizing the expense, Apple Computer’s income would fall from $786,000,000 to
$115,000,000 as shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Effect of Steve Jobs’ Backdated Stock Options on Apple Computer’s
Income Statement

Apple Computer
Consolidated Statements of Operations for the fiscal year ended
September 30, 2000
(Dollars in millions)
Steve Jobs
Restated
Restated
under SFAS
under SFAS
123(R>
123(R)
with
without
backdating
backdating
Original
Net Sales
$7,983
$7,983
$7,983
Cost of Sales
5,817
5,817
5,817
2,166
2,166
2,166
Gross Margin
£
Operating expenses:
Research and development
Selling, general, and
administrative
Special charges:
Executive bonus
Restructuring costs
In-process research
and development
Total operating expenses
Operating income
Gains from sales of investment
Interest and other income, net
Total interest and other income.
net
Income before provision for
income taxes
Provision for income taxes
Net income

380

380

380

1,166

1,613

1,837

90
8

90
8

90
8

0
1,644
522
367
203

0
2.091
75
367
203

0
2,315
£

QM

570

570

570

1,092
306

645
306
$332

421
306
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367
203
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Four top executives - 2001
In January of 2001,four unidentified top executives for Apple Computer were
awarded eight million stock options as a form of compensation. Stated as being granted
in January of 2001, the grant price of the options and the market price ofthe underlying
stock at that time was around S8 per share. These options are suspected ofbeing
backdated due to the fact that the price ofthe stock rose dramatically, even by the end of
the same month. By the end of January and the beginning of February, the stock price
increased to $11 per share (“Perfect Payday: Options Scorecard”). If the executives chose
to exercise their eight million options for $64,000,000, they could then sell them into the
market for $88,000,000. These four top executives at Apple Computer would have made
a profit of$24,000,000.
Since SFAS 123(R) was not put into effect until 2004, Apple Computer still used
the intrinsic value method of recognizing compensation expense in their statement of
operations. In other words, Apple Computer did not recognize any compensation expense
since the options had the same grant price and current stock price at the reported time of
grant. If the fair-value method for recognizing compensation expense had been used to
measure the options’ worth, the company would have to show compensation expense of
$4.32 per share, or $34,578,909.78 for the eight million options. Recognizing the
compensation expense would worsen the company’s financial position by increasing their
loss from $25,000,000 to $60,000,000.
The compensation expense of almost $35 million is calculated using the
backdated grant and current stock price of$8 per share. While this deduction fi*om net
income is certainly much better than recognizing no compensation expense at all, the
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amount of compensation expense could be much greater. In fact, if Apple Computer had
calculated the compensation expense as if the grant date had been at the end of January or
beginning of February, the fair value of each share would be $5.94. The total
compensation expense to be recognized would be $47,546,000.95 and would be deducted
from net income. The difference of$12,967,091.17 would be the amount by which net
income would be overstated due to the backdating. This would change Apple Computer’s
financial bottom line from a $25,000,000 loss to a $73,000,000 loss. Figure 5 shows the
changes in Apple’s reported net income due to compensation expense related to
employee stock options.

29

Figure 5; Effect of 4 Top Executives’ Backdated stock Options on Apple
Computer’s Income Statement

Apple Computer
Consolidated Statements of Operations for the fiscal year ended September 29, 2001
(Dollars in millions)
4 Top Executives
Restated under
Restated
SFAS 123(R1
under SFAS
without
123(Rlwith
backdating
Original
backdating
Net Sales
Cost of Sales
Gross Margin

$5,363
4.128
1.235

$5,363
4.128
1.235

$5,363
4.128
1.235

430
1,138

430
1,173

430
1,186

0
0

0
0

0
0

11
1.579
(344)
88

11
1.614
(379)
88

11
1.627
(392)
88

(13)
217
292

(13)
217
292

(13)
217
292

(52)

(87)

(100)

im

illi

12

12
(S73J

Operating expenses:
Research and development
Selling, general, and administrative
Special Charges:
Executive bonus
Restructuring costs
In-process research and
development
Total operating expenses
Operating income (loss)
Gains on non-current investment, net
Unrealized loss on convertible securities
Interest and other income, net
Total interest and other income, net
Income (loss) before provision for
income taxes
Provision for (benefit from)income
taxes
Income (Loss) before accounting change
Cumulative effect of accounting
change, net of income taxes of $5
Net income (toss)

i3Zi
12

lsm
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As evidenced by the above examples, once these financial statements are
corrected to record the actual grant date, these backdated stock options would have
actually had value. The resulting compensation expense would then reduce the
company’s earnings. The effect of backdating produces material misstatements on the
financial statements of companies. These misstatements lead to the requirement that the
company restate its financial statements to correct the errors. Restatements are necessary
to inform shareholders and the public ofthe changes.
This restatement will recast their financial statements to exhibit the proper
accounting for the stock options. The following chart [Figure 6] produced by Thomas L.
Porter, PhD,CPA reveals which amounts on the financial statements will change in a
restatement for backdating.
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Figure 6: Changes in Financial Statement Amounts Due to Restatement for
Backdating
Relative to the
Financial
Statement
Item in the
Vesting Period

Amount Originally
Reported,in a
Restatement, the
Amount of this Item

Why?

in the Vesting
Period will...

Compensation
Expense

Increase

To reflect the intrinsic value of options on
the measurement date.

Net Income

Decrease

The increase in compensation expense will
decrease net income.

Number of
shares

No change

No new shares are issued as a result ofthe

outstanding

Paid-in-Capital

Increase

restatement for backdating.
Option-related compensation expense
increases paid-in-capital. Ultimately, this
has the effect of permanently transferring
retained earnings to paid-in-capital.
Because net income decreases in the

Retained

Decrease

restatement, retained earnings, which is the
accumulation ofimdistributed earnings over
time, will decrease.

Taxes paid

No change (but may
increase in exercise
period)

The amount ofthe deduction from taxable
income for option-related compensation
may be limited.

Earnings per
Share

Decrease

Because net income decreases but the
number ofshares outstanding has remained
unchanged, EPS will decrease.

Cash flow from
operations

No Change(but may
decrease in exercise

earnings

period)

Option-related compensation expense is not
paid in cash.
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An Example of Previous Research
The majority of financial fraud stories reported in recent news involved financial
statements that intentionally misled company stakeholders by inappropriately conveying
the appearance of high earnings. Due to the number ofcompanies forced by the
government to restate their financial reports, there has been speculation on whether or not
CEO stock option compensation may affect the company’s financial statements’
reliability. Four professors recently performed a study,‘‘Do CEO Stock Options Prevent
or Promote Fraudulent Financial Reporting?” in order to examine which activities
performed by companies led to a restatement of their reports.
This study performed by Dr. Joseph P. O’Connor, Jr., Dr. Richard L. Priem, Dr.
Joseph E. Coombs, and Dr. K. Matthew Gilley, was published in the September 1, 2005
issue of Academy ofManagement Journal and involved the testing of several hypotheses.
The first hypothesis was divided into two sections. The first section dealt with the
traditional agency theory which states that the awarding ofcompensation in the form of
stock options aligns the goals of management with those ofthe shareholders. That is,
management will not behave in a way that endangers the interests ofshareholders in
order to serve themselves. O’Connor et al stated six hypotheses. “Hypothesis la. The
higher the value of a CEO’s stock options, the lower the likelihood of fraudulent financial
reporting.” The second section ofthe first hypothesis supported the unprincipled agent
theory which involves unprincipled managers who take advantage of opportunities from
which they will benefit while the company and its shareholders will suffer. Thus,
“Hypothesis lb. The higher the value of a CEO’s stock options, the higher the likelihood
of fraudulent financial reporting.”
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The second hypothesis dealt with the topic of CEO power. The form of CEO
power the study is referring to is CEO duality, which occurs when the CEO is
simultaneously serving as the chair of the board of directors(BOD).“Hypothesis 2. The
presence of CEO duality strengthens the association between the value of CEO stock
options and the incidence offraudulent financial reporting.” This means that a company
with CEO duality will either be more likely or less likely to have fraudulent financial
statements than a company without CEO duality. Under the agency theory, CEO duality
will make it easier to ensure that the interests of the company’s stockholders are carried
out. Under the unprincipled agent theory, however, there is a greater chance that CEO
duality will result in fraudulent financial reporting in order to cover up self-serving
activities.
The third hypothesis in the O’Connor study considered whether or not the board
of directors received stock options as a part oftheir compensation. “Hypothesis 3. The
presence of BOD stock options strengthens the association between the value of CEO
stock options and the incidence offraudulent financial reporting.” Under the agency
theory, the interests ofthe BOD would become more aligned with those ofthe
shareholders. Therefore, the likelihood offraudulent financial reports would be lessened.
Yet, there would be a greater chance offraudulent financial reports under the
unprincipled agent viewpoint, where the BOD would be less likely to monitor the
behavior of management because they would also use aggressive and sometimes
unethical, accounting behavior in order to boost the price ofthe company’s stock.
The fourth and final hypothesis considered the effect on financial reporting if both
CEO duality and BOD stock option compensation occurred simultaneously. “Hypothesis
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4. The simultaneous presence of CEO duality and BOD stock options strengthens even
more the association between the value ofCEO stock options and the incidence of
fraudulent financial reporting, beyond the individual moderating effects.” In other words,
under the agency theory, the concurrent presence of CEO duality and BOD stock options,
indicating power and influence respectively, would allow greater pursuit of shareholders’
interests by the CEO while the BOD is more active in monitoring the actions ofthe CEO.
Otherwise, the unprincipled agent theory states that under both conditions, the CEOs
would pursue their own interests while the BOD would not interfere, and sometimes
cooperate, also in order to pursue their own interests.
To test these hypotheses, the researchers used a matched-pairs analysis of firms.
They first selected firms that had intentionally inflated their financial results on their
financial statements and met all ofthe following criteria: 1)They had restated their
financial accounts downward; 2)the misreporting ofthe financial statements was not
related to any changes in accounting principles or to any non-financial matters; and 3)
they only made restatements after they received pressure from federal or state regulatory
agencies responding to perceived misconduct. Each ofthese firms

was then matched to a

firm that had not had to restate their financial reports. In deciding which firms to

use in

the matched pairs, eight matching variables were employed: firm independence, public
ownership, U.S. citizenship, 1996-2004 time period, industry (4-digit SIC)classification,
1996-1999 average annual net sales, 1996-1999 average net income, and 1996-1999
average annual vesting period.
Through the use ofthe conditional logistic regression model, the researchers
discovered some results that agreed with several oftheir hypotheses and some results that
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disagreed with several of their hypotheses. With the CEO stock options odds ratio of
0.628, the agency theory was supported for the first hypothesis(The higher the value of a
CEO’s stock options, the lower the likelihood offraudulent financial reporting) by
suggesting a $1 million increase in options results in a 37.2 percent decrease in the
likelihood offraudulent financial reporting.
The results for the remaining hypotheses are more confusing, however. Increasing
the amount of CEO stock options in order to lower the incidence offraudulent financial
reporting as prescribed in the agency theory is only true either when 1)CEO duality
exists and the BOD receive stock options as part oftheir compensation, or 2)there is no
CEO duality and the BOD does not receive any stock options. Under the unprincipled
agent theory, increasing the amount of CEO stock options led to increased incidence of
fraudulent financial reporting when 3)CEO duality exists while the BOD does not
receive stock option compensation, or 4)there is

no CEO duality but the BOD does

receive stock options. The second finding supported the researchers’ early prediction by
producing the smallest likelihood offraudulent financial reporting. However, the fourth
finding went against the researchers’ predictions by generating the greatest likelihood of
fraudulent financial reporting when there was an increase in CEO stock options.
In addition to these findings, the researchers discovered that there is a negative
relationship between the average annual number of audit committee meetings and the
likelihood offraudulent financial reporting. Therefore, by increasing the number of times
the audit committee members meet to monitor management activities, the less likely the
company will experience the occurrence offraudulent financial reports. The age of the
CEO is also negatively related to the likelihood offraudulent financial reporting. This
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finding supports earlier research dealing with the relationships of age to risk aversion and
a lessening propensity toward criminality.
While the O’Connor et al. study is informative, it does not address the question of
how the idea for backdating employee stock options migrates from one company to
another. For CEO duality to have an effect on the likelihood offraudulent financial
reporting, the executives had to first discover the idea to backdate employee stock
options. It seems unlikely that each executive brainstormed the idea independently.
The next section of the thesis describes research performed in an effort to uncover
the effect of networking between executives in spreading the practice of backdating.
Research Methods
The first hypothesis examined in this study is that networking among executives
and board members ofcorporations have spread the idea ofbackdating stock options.
The second hypothesis is that some auditing firms are more likely than others to audit
corporations accused of backdating stock options. The first hypothesis is addressed by
selecting a group of companies accused of backdating stock options then collecting the
names ofeach companies top executives and board members. The names were sorted to
see if any appeared for more than one company. Similarly, to address the second
question, the names of the corporation’s auditor at the time of the alleged backdating
were gathered and analyzed to see if any firm appeared an unexpected number of times.
Source of Data
In a 2006 issue of Wall Street Journal, the article “Perfect Payday: Options
Scorecard” listed over 141 companies implicated in backdating stock options from 1994
to 2006. The Wall Street Journal further analyzed sixteen of those companies in order to
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give more information on the suspected backdating. Charts were provided illustrating the
stock price behavior prior to and subsequent to the reported date of grant. By studying
these charts, it is apparent that the reported date of the stock option grant coincided with
dates when the market price for the stock was uncharacteristically low.
For instance, Jeffrey Rich received a total of six stock option grants as the former
Chief Executive Officer of Affiliated Computer Services. These six grants were made
over a period ofseven years on dates when the stock prices were substantially lower than
the average market price. The odds of these favorable dates being chosen without deceit
are about one in 300 billion (“Perfect Payday: Options Scorecard”). These options

were

more than likely backdated to provide benefits for both Rich and Affiliated Computer
Services.
The sixteen companies selected for further analysis by the Wall Street Journal
were used for this research. The more detailed information given surrounding the stock
option grant dates suspected of being backdated was useful in gathering the data to
investigate the key officers, board of directors, and auditors for these sixteen companies
at those dates. The sixteen companies also provided a look at a variety of industries. The
companies and their industries are listed in Figure 7.
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Figure 7: Sixteen Companies Selected by the Wall Street Journal for In Depth
Analysis for Backdating Stock Options
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The Securities and Exchange Commission uses the Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC)code system to specify what industry a particular company belongs
to. Administered by the Statistical Policy Division ofthe U.S. Office of Management and
Budget, the system was established to classify all industries in the U.S. economy. A twodigit code designates each major industry group, and it is coupled with a second two-digit
code representing subcategories(“Whafs a SIC Code?”). For the purpose ofthis
research, it is not necessary to break down the companies according to subcategory. The
selected companies represent ten different SIC categories. The category most common to
companies suspected of backdating options grants is Electronic and Electrical Equipment
& Components(Except Computer Equipment). This category contained four ofthe
sixteen companies [Figure 8].
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Figure 8: Selected Backdating Companies by Industry
^\
c

;

■-xV'V

■ !; ,■,V1
'*
. .1'i-

15

‘P

^ a>
in:: ,i‘ ‘ -ts:’:;. r
V .--■

SA'iitEMSlSSl

Building Construction - General Contractors & Operative Builders
KB Home

35

Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment
Brooks Automation, Inc.
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Comverse Technology, Inc.
Jabil Circuit, Inc.
Trident Microsystems, Inc.
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Boston Communications Group, Inc
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UnitedHealth Group, Inc.
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I

78

Affiliated Computer Services, Inc.
Monster Worldwide, Inc.
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Pixar

80

Health Services
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Renal Care Group, Inc
Educational Services
Apollo Group, Inc
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* 1

All sixteen are large publicly traded companies. Six companies are traded on the
New York Stock Exchange, eight companies are traded on Nasdaq, and two companies
are traded over-the-counter using Pink Sheets. The Securities and Exchange Commission
requires that publicly traded companies have their financial statements audited by
independent auditors. These financial statements, such as the annually issued Form 10-K,
provide information concerning the financial position ofthe company and many ofits
activities, including their accounting methods for stock option grants [Figure 9].
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Figure 9: Selected Backdating Companies by Trading Exchange
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Form 10-Ks for each ofthe sixteen companies were acquired for the years of
backdating from the United States Securities and Exchange Commission’s EDGAR
database. The Form 10-Ks contain the names ofthe top executives, board member and
audit firms for the sixteen companies. The search yielded a total of 136 executives, 146
board members and six unique auditing firms.
Findings
From the information collected from the Form 10-Ks, there are two instances of
overlap between companies. Stephen P. Jobs served as the CEO and as a member of the
Board of Directors for both Apple Computer and Pixar Animation Studios. James A.
Johnson served on the Board of Directors for KB Home and UnitedHealth Group, Inc.
PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP was the accounting firm responsible for auditing six ofthe
sixteen companies. KPMG,LLP was responsible for four ofthe sixteen companies.
Figure 10 shows the percentage ofcompanies suspected of backdating per audit firm,and
Figure 11 lists the companies audited by each audit firm.
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Figure 10

Percentage of Backdating Companies
Audited by a Particular Audit Firm
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Figure 11: Auditors of Selected Backdating Companies
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Based on the research conducted, it is not apparent that there is much networking
between companies concerning the treatment of stock options. With only two instances of
dual roles where the same person is involved with multiple companies, the conclusion of
this study is that the practice of backdating stock options is not due to the idea being
carried from one company to another through a network of overlapping executives and
directors.
The finding that PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP was responsible for the audits of
six of the sixteen companies (38%) in the sample suspected of backdating is not
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conclusive evidence that the firm may have been the source ofthe client’s backdating

idea.
Summary and Conclusions
This research addressed the question of whether the idea for backdating stock
options is due to networking between executives and directors ofdifferent companies. If
one person acted as the Chief Financial Officer ofone company that backdated its stock
options, he may spread the idea to another company for which he served on the board of
directors. This research also investigated whether one particular auditing firm was more
likely than others to serve clients later accused of inappropriately backdating stock option
grants to key employees.
Stock options are important because they are one ofa corporation’s most popular
forms of compensation for key employees. Their popularity arises fi’om the stock options
replacement of more costly forms of compensation such as cash bonuses, permanent
salary increases, and expensive postretirement benefits. Corporations also use stock
options in hopes ofbetter aligning the goals of employees with those ofstockholders.
Since employee stock options can have a major impact on reported net income,
corporations should be sure to follow the guidelines set for proper accounting treatment.
The benefits of granting stock options have been abused by the practice of
backdating. When a corporation grants stock options but alters the grant date to coincide
with a time period when the market price ofthe underlying stock was lowest, the
corporation and employee both benefit; the corporation reports a lower amount of
compensation expense, and the employee can receive a larger gain upon exercise ofthe
options. As the practice of backdating has become more prevalent among companies, the
47

Securities and Exchange Commission has become more involved in regulating the use of
stock options and investigating companies suspected of backdating.
This study was conducted to discover whether an executive or board member of
one company that practiced backdating was responsible for spreading the idea of
backdating to other companies he or she served. After selecting a sample of companies
under investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission for backdating stock
options, the names of executives, board members, and auditing firms were collected fi'om
the companies’ Form 10-Ks. These names were sorted to find if there were any instances
of one person being employed by more than one company suspected of backdating.
After analyzing the list of 136 executives, 146 board members and six unique
auditing firms, it was discovered that there were two instances where an executive or
board member served two different companies. The research also found that
PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP was the auditing firm responsible for the financial
statement audit of six ofthe sixteen companies(37.5%). The auditing firm with the next
highest number ofcompanies in the sample was KPMG,LLP with four ofthe sixteen
companies(25%).
The information yielded by this research is not conclusive evidence that the
prevalent use ofbackdating stock options is due to the actions ofone or two executives.
By finding only two instances where one employee served two companies suspected of
backdating, it does not appear that the backdating virus spread from one particular source
to infect numerous companies. The finding that PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP was the
independent auditor for more ofthe companies in the sample than any other audit firm
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also cannot be linked to the conclusion that the auditing firm carried the backdating idea
to its clients.
Limitations and Suggested Future Research
There were several limitations in conducting this research. Firstly, the sample
used in conducting the study was very limited. Ifthe sample was broadened to include
more companies, the research may have resulted with findings contradictory to these.
Secondly, the companies used in this study were from a very wide variety ofindustries.
More conclusive evidence might be found by selecting a sample ofcompanies firom a
single industry. Finally, the way this research was conducted will not necessarily prove
that the spread of backdating is not the result ofan executive ofone company telling
another company he serves to do the same. More covert cases of networking and
collusion happen in which the idea is spread without the person actually serving the other
company. An executive may just tell a group offiiends about backdating, and the fnends
take the idea to each ofthe companies they are employed by. There will be little to no
evidence to support this suspicion, but this may be the real reason for the spread of
backdating.
The limitations stated above should be taken into consideration when conducting
further research into this subject. By encompassing a greater number ofcompanies
focused in one industry, there could be very different results. Another suggestion for
further research is to investigate the steps that the Securities and Exchange Commission
takes to regulate the practice of granting stock options. For instance, one proposal is for
companies to select certain dates to grant stock options to employees. These dates should
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be recorded in the company’s bylaws, and the company will not be allowed to make
grants on dates other than those specified by the bylaws.

50

Bibliography

51

’'Affiliated Computer Services Incorporation Form 10-K.” Securities and Exchange Commission
1995 to 2002. 26 April 2007. <http://sec.gov/cgi-bin^rowseedgar?company=&CIK=ACS&filenum=
&State=&SIC=&owner=include&action=getcompany>.
“Apollo Group Incorporation Form 10-K.” Securities and Exchange Commission 1995 to 2002.
26 April 2007. <http://sec.gov/cgi-bind)rowseedgar?company=&CIK=APOL&filenum=&State=&
SIC=&owner=include&action=getcompany>.
Apostolou, Nicholas G. and D. Larry Crumbley.“Accounting for Stock Options: Update on the
Continuing Conflict.” The CPA Journal 75.8 (August 2005): 30-34.
“Apple Incorporation Form 10-K.” Securities and Exchange Commission 1995 to 2002. 26 April
2007. <http://sec.gov/cgi-bin^^owseedgar?company=&CIK=AAPL&filenum=&State=&
SIC=&owner=include&action=getcompany>.
“Boston Communications Group Incorporation Form 10-K.” Securities and Exchange
Commission 1995 to 2002. 28 April 2007. <http://sec.gov/cgi-bin^rowseedgar?company=&CIK=BCGI&
filenum=&State=&SIC=&owner=include&action=getcompany>.
“Brooks Automation Incorporation Form 10-K.” Securities and Exchange Commission 1995 to
2002. 28 April 2007. <http://sec.gov/cgi-bin^^owseedgar?company=&CIK=BRKS&filenum
=&State=&SIC=&owner=include&action=getcompany>.
“CBOE History.” Chicago Board Options Exchange 25 August 2007
<http://www.cboe.com/AboutCBOE/History.aspx>.
“Chummy CEOs Part of Backdating Club: Scandal Shines in the Spotlight on
Perils in Silicon Valley.” MSNBC\2> November 2006. 8 March 2007
<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15655246/>.

Social Networking

Cleary, Brian. “Managing the Risks Associated with Stock Options Backdating.” The CPA
Journal 11A (April 2007): 12-14.
Colvin, Geoffrey.“A Study in CEO Greed.” Fortune 30 May 2006. 21 April 2007
<http://money.cnn.eom/2006/05/26/magazines/fortune/colvin_fortune_0612/>.
“Comverse Technology Incorporation Form lO-K.” Securities and Exchange Commission 1995
to 2002. 28 April 2007. <http://sec.gov/cgi-bin/browseedgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000803014<& owner=include&count==40>.
52

Eaton, Tim V. and Brian R. Prucyk.“No Longer an ‘Option.’’Vownia/ ofAccountancy 199.4
(April 2005): 63-68.
“Executive Remuneration.” The Chartered Institute ofManagement Accountants May 2001.18
February 2007 <http://www.cimaglobal.eom/cps/rde/xbcr/SID-0AAAC5440B965129/live/tec_exec_remuneration.pdf>.
“Facts about FASB.” Financial Accounting Standards Board March 2007. 3 September 2007
<http://www.fasb.org/facts/>.
“Jabil Circuit Incorporation Form 10-K.” Securities and Exchange Commission 1995 to 2002.28
April 2007. <http://sec.gov/cgi-bin^rowseedgar?company=+&CIK=JBL&filenum=&State=&SIC
=&owner=include&action=getcompany>.
“KB Home Form 10-K.” Securities and Exchange Commission 1995 to 2002.28 April 2007.
<http://sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?company=+&CIK=KBH&filenum=&State=&
SIC=&owner=include&action=getcompany>.
“KLA-Tencor Corporation Form 10-K.” Securities and Exchange Commission 1995 to 2002. 28
April 2007. <http://sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?company=+&CIK=KLAC&filenum-&
State=&SIC=&owner=include&action=getcompany>.
Kunkel, J. Gregory and Richard T. Lau.“Compensation Plans and the New Stock Option
Accounting Rules: Early Adopters Plan for Changes.” The CPA Journal 75.1 (January
2005): 28-31.
Lie, Erik. “Backdating of Executive Stock Option(ESO)Grants.” University ofIowa 1
November 2007 <http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/faculty/elie/backdating.htm>.
Mantzke, Katrina and B.D. Clinton. “Stock Options Analyzed from Three Accounting
Perspectives: Managerial, Financial, and Tax.” Management Accounting Quarterly
(Spring 2003): 24-31.
“Meade Instruments Corporation Form 10-K.” Securities and Exchange Commission 1995 to
2002. 28 April 2007. <http://sec.gov/cgi-bin^rowseedgar?company=+&CIK=MEAD&filenum=&
State=&SIC=&owner=include&action=getcompany>.
“Monster Worldwide Incorporation Form 10-K.” Securities and Exchange Commission 1995 to
2002. 28 April 2007. <http://sec.gov/cgi-bin^rowseedgar?company=+&CIK=MNST&filenum=&
State=&SIC=&owner=include&action=getcompany>.

53

O’Connor, Joseph P., et al. “Do CEO Stock Options Prevent or Promote Fraudulent Financial
Reporting?” Academy ofManagement Journal 49.3(June 2006): 483-500.
“Perfect Payday: Options Scorecard.” The Wall Street Journal Online(4 September 2007) 15
November 2007 < http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/infooptionsscore06-full.html>.
“Pixar Form 10-K.” Securities and Exchange Commission 1995 to 2002. 28 April 2007.
<http://sec.gov/cgi-biml)rowse-edgar?company=PIXAR&CIK=&filenum=&State=&
SlC=&owner=include&action=getcompany>.
Porter, Thomas L. “Backdating Options: Frequently Asked Accounting Questions.” NERA
Economic Consulting(30 June 2006)7 April 2007 <http://wvm.nera.com/image/PUB_
FAAQ_Options_Backdating_SEC1236_FINAL.pdf.>.
“Renal Care Group, Incorporated Form 10-K.” Securities and Exchange Commission 1995 to
2002. 28 April 2007. <http://sec.gov/cgi-bin/browseedgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000920052& owner=include&count=40>.

Rosen, Corey. “Stock Option Backdating and Other Grant Timing Controversies.” The Nationa
Centerfor Employee Ownership (July 2006)23 April 2007
<http://www.nceo.org/library/stock-option-backdating.html>.
Ruud, Judith S. “Accounting for Employee Stock Options.” Congress ofthe U.S., Congressional
Budget Office (April 2004)5 February 2007
<http://www.cbo.gOv/ftpdocs/53xx/doc5334/04-02-StockOptions.pdf>.
Sellers, Keith, Yingping Huang, and Brett. A. King.“Are Your ESO Values on Target? Journal
ofAccountancy 205.3(March 2008): 44-56.
“Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.123 (revised 2004): Share-Based Payment.
Financial Accounting Standards Board(December 2004)2 March 2007
<http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas123r.pdf>.
“The Evolution of Modem Options Trading.” TDD Options. 24 August 2007.
<http://tddoptions.com/tdd_Education/history/index.cfm>.
“The trouble with Stock Options.” The Economist. 352.8131 (August 1999).
“Trident Microsystems Incorporation Form 10-K.” Securities and Exchange Commission 1995 to
2002. 28 April 2007. <http://sec.gov/cgi-bin^rowseedgar?company=&CIK=TRID&filenum=4&State= &
SIC=&owner=include&action=getcompany>.
54

UnitedHealth Group Incorporation Form lO-K.” Securities and Exchange Commission 1995 to
2002. 28 April 2007. <http://sec.gov/cgi-bin^rowseedgar?company=&CIK=UNH&filenum=&State=&
SlC=&owner=include&action=getcompany>.
‘Vitesse Semiconductor Corporation Form 10-K.” Securities and Exchange Commission 1995 to
2002. 28 April 2007. <http://sec.gov/cgi-bin^rowseedgar?company=Vitesse+Semiconductor&CIK=&
filenum=&State=&SlC=&owner=include&action=getcompany>.
‘What’s a SIC Code?” SICCode.com 12 September 2007 <http://www.siccode.com/about.php>.

55

